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Abstract. Evolutionary dynamics provides an iconic relationship—the periodic frequency of a game is de-
termined by the payoff matrix of the game. This paper reports the first experimental evidence to demon-
strate this relationship. Evidence comes from two populations randomly-matched 2 × 2 games with 12
different payoff matrix parameters. The directions, frequencies and changes in the radius of the cycles
are measured definitively. The main finding is that the observed periodic frequencies of the persistent cy-
cles are significantly different in games with different parameters. Two replicator dynamics, standard and
adjusted, are employed as predictors for the periodic frequency. Interestingly, both of the models could
infer the difference of the observed frequencies well. The experimental frequencies linearly, positively and
significantly relate to the theoretical frequencies, but the adjusted model performs slightly better.
Key words. experimental economics; game theory; evolutionary dynamics; detailed balance condition;
definitive measurement
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1 Introduction
Game theory, including classical game theory [1] and evo-
lutionary game theory [2], provides a mathematical frame-
work for systems ranging from microbial [3] to social econ-
omy [4]. However, the theoretical predictions of classical
game theory and evolutionary game theory sometimes dif-
fer, two typical examples of this being the Matching Pen-
nies game [5,6,7,8] and the Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
In these games, evolutionary game theory predicts clear
cyclic motions in social state space [9,6,10,11,12], while
classical game theory does not.
As a major source of knowledge in social sciences [13],
laboratory experiments have been employed to test evo-
lutionary game theory [14]. Although experiments have
supported the existence of the cycles [14,15,16,17], the
definitive measurement of cycles has rarely been reported.
Quite recently, in a continuous time and centralised infor-
mation protocol, cycles have been found in Rock-Paper-
Scissors (RPS)-like games [18]. In addition, Xu, Zhou and
Send offprint requests to:
a Present address:
Wang have studied cycles in standard RPS games with
a random matching and decentralised information proto-
col [19]. They proved that cycles do exist in continuous
time RPS-like games [18] and discrete time standard RPS
games [19]. Additionally, the directions of all of the cycles
detected in these RPS experiments met the evolutionary
dynamics very well [18,19]. Therefore, we can say that the
cycles in the experiments are qualitatively consistent with
the expectations of evolutionary game theory.
Subsequently, a straightforward question arises, namely
what is the quantitative relationship between cycles in ex-
periments and the parameters of the games? To answer
this question, we look to the central frequencies of the cy-
cles which can be (1) measured definitively in experiments
and (2) explicitly calculated based on dynamics equations.
Our data is from Selten and Chmura’s experiments of
twelve 2 × 2 games [20] (see Fig. 1 and Table 1). Accord-
ing to replicator dynamics models [9,2,10,21], the payoff
matrices of the twelve games indicate that the transits
among social states in each game should form endless cy-
cles. As mentioned in Ref. [22], evolutionary game theory
has rarely been supported by human experiments. In this
article, we will reveal the cycles in the 12 experiments.
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Fig. 1. Payoff matrix of the 2×2 game. For the 12 games, the
elements of the payoff matrix are different, see Table 1.
With methods rooted in non-equilibrium statistical physics [19],
we counted the cycles chronologically in the experiments.
The main results include: (1) cycles exist; (2) cycles are
persistent; (3) the empirical cyclic frequencies in the 12
games are quantitatively different, see Table 2. Moreover,
the differences could be well described by the theoretical
frequencies derived from replicator dynamics models, see
Table 3.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next
section, we will briefly introduce the 12 experiments and
provide the theoretical predictions for the cycles. In Sec-
tion 3, the measuring methods for the cycles are explained.
Section 4 summarises the results. The last section includes
discussions and summary.
2 Experiments and Theoretical expectations
To capture the cyclic social behaviours in laboratory game
experiments, we use the existing well-known experimental
data of Selten and Chmura [20] and refer to two theoreti-
cal models of evolutionary dynamics [9,2,10,21], standard
replicator dynamics and adjusted replicator dynamics.
2.1 Two-population 2× 2 games experiments
The original aim of Setlen and Chumra’s experimental in-
vestigation is to compare the performance of the five sta-
tionary concepts [20]. They designed twelve 2 × 2 cyclic
matching-pennies-like games [21,7]. Games 1 to 6 are constant-
sum games, and each of them contains 12 groups; games 7
to 12 are non-constant-sum games, and each of them con-
tains 6 groups. In addition, games 7 to 12 have the same
Nash equilibria as the games 1 to 6, respectively.
Each of the 108 groups consists of two four-person pop-
ulations, so a total of 864 subjects are involved in the
experiments. Each group plays the game for 200 rounds
repeatedly. The strategy set for each player in the first
population (denoted by X) is (X1,X2); while the strategy
set for each player in the second population (denoted by
Y ) is (Y1,Y2). In each round, every subject plays the game
against an opponent randomly picked from the other pop-
ulation. The payoff matrix for each game has the same
form as Fig. 1 shows, where aij (bij) indicates the payoff
for the player in the first (second) population, i, j = 1, 2.
The specific value of aij (bij) in each game is exhibited in
Table 1.
2.2 Predictions from two replicator dynamics
As an approximation, evolutionary game dynamics can be
a powerful tool to describe finite population games [23,24,
14,18]. It takes the social state, i.e. the combination of the
densities of strategies in each population [12], as a crucial
object and analyses its motion in state space. In this case,
each social state is denoted as x:=(p, q), where p (q) is the
density of X1 (Y1) in the first (second) population X(Y )
and the state space is X={0, 1
4
, 2
4
, 3
4
, 1}×{0, 1
4
, 2
4
, 3
4
, 1}, as
in Fig. 2 (for more details, see Appendix A). According to
evolutionary game dynamics, the social state will change
in the state space.
As predictors, the two models—standard replicator dy-
namics and adjusted replicator dynamics—are used as ref-
erences. The advantage of the two models is that they are
parameter free and the most widely used [21,2,12,16,7].
The solutions in a (sufficiently small) neighbourhood of
the Nash equilibrium can be calculated for the two dy-
namics for the twelve games. According to the calculation,
the motions in these games are cyclic (see Appendix A)
and equivalent to two-dimensional simple harmonic mo-
tions (see Appendix J in [2]). Therefore, based on these
two models, the observed social state is supposed to keep
moving in the state space [9,2,10,21] and thus form end-
less cycles, which leads to the following theoretical predic-
tions:
1. The cycles, for all 12 games, exist and persist. Mean-
while, the directions of the cycles are all clockwise.
2. The frequencies of the cycles are different (for numeri-
cal results see Table 1, in which fs and fa respectively
indicate the predictions from standard and adjusted
replicator dynamics).
3. The radius of the cycles, for all 12 games, should re-
main unchanged over time.
With 12 experimental 2× 2 games, we verify the exis-
tence and persistence of the cycles; and test the frequen-
cies of cycles quantitatively. Furthermore, we find that
the observed periodic frequencies of the cycles are differ-
ent among games. Moreover, the experimental frequencies
are linearly, positively and significantly related to the the-
oretical frequencies.
3 Measurement
In evolutionary game theory, social state is used to de-
scribe social evolution [12]. For the 12 experiments of finite
population in this article, the state space is discrete [25,
22,18]. As illustrated in Fig. 2, there are altogether 25
social states (the explanations are given in A.1 in the Ap-
pendix). For a certain round t, the social state must be
one of the 25 states. Across the experimental rounds, the
observed state should transit, and a stochastic-like trajec-
tory should be formed [12,18,24,14].
In stochastic dynamics processes, as emphasised by
Young [26], in the detailed balance condition, the transi-
tions between any pair of states is symmetric. According
to classical game theory, no net transit can be found in
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Table 1. Payoff matrices, equilibrium, eigenvalues and theoretical frequencies.
Game a11 b11 a12 b12 a21 b21 a22 b22 xN
§ yN λ
2
s
† λ2a fs
‡ fa
1 10 8 0 18 9 9 10 8 0.91 0.09 -0.83 -0.01 0.1447 0.0161
2 9 4 0 13 6 7 8 5 0.73 0.18 -3.57 -0.08 0.3007 0.0463
3 8 6 0 14 7 7 10 4 0.91 0.27 -1.98 -0.04 0.2241 0.0320
4 7 4 0 11 5 6 9 2 0.82 0.36 -4.17 -0.14 0.3248 0.0591
5 7 2 0 9 4 5 8 1 0.73 0.36 -5.55 -0.28 0.3751 0.0841
6 7 1 1 7 3 5 8 0 0.64 0.46 -6.94 -0.45 0.4193 0.1071
7 10 12 4 22 9 9 14 8 0.91 0.09 -0.83 -0.01 0.1447 0.0155
8 9 7 3 16 6 7 11 5 0.73 0.18 -3.57 -0.07 0.3007 0.0419
9 8 9 3 17 7 7 13 4 0.91 0.27 -1.98 -0.03 0.2241 0.0297
10 7 6 2 13 5 6 11 2 0.82 0.36 -4.17 -0.11 0.3248 0.0537
11 7 4 2 11 4 5 10 1 0.73 0.36 -5.55 -0.21 0.3751 0.0734
12 7 3 3 9 3 5 10 0 0.64 0.46 -6.94 -0.31 0.4193 0.0880
§ xN (yN) is the Nash equilibrium for the X (Y) population [20];
† λ2s (λ
2
a) is the square of the eigenvalue calculated from
standard (adjusted) replicator dynamics Eq. 13 (Eq. 20) in Section A.3; ‡ fs (fa) is the theoretical frequency of the standard
(adjusted) replicator dynamics.
the state space and the system is in equilibrium under
this condition.
On the contrary, evolutionary game theory predicts
that the transits among the states are asymmetrical. For
example, in Fig 2, transit 3→4 should be more frequent
than the reverse (4→3), because transit 3→4 corresponds
to the direction of the cycles moving around the Nash equi-
librium. Therefore, the detailed balance symmetry should
be broken and a pattern of net transit (cycles) must emerge
in the long run [25,27,28].
3.1 Cycle counting
To verify the cycles quantitatively, we look to Poincare
section (tripwire) [18,19] for counting cycles. First, we set
a segment S called the Poincare section [18], as shown in
Fig. 2, from Pc = (α, β) to Pe = (α, 0), and we take (α, β)
equal to the Nash equilibrium point (xN , yN) (see Table 1)
of each game. A transit is a directional segment from state
(x1, y1) observed at time t to state (x2, y2) at time t+ 1.
These two segments could intersect at X as
X :≡ (Xx, Xy) =
(
α, y1 +
(y2 − y1)(α− x1)
x2 − x1
)
(1)
According to Ref [19], the value of Ci for a transit from
time t to t+ 1 should be:
1. Ci = 0, if X 6∈ (Pc, Pe] ∪ x2 = x1
2. Ci = 1, if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 > α > x1
3. Ci = −1, if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 < α < x1
4. Ci =
1
2
, if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 > x1 ∩ (x1 = α ∪ x2 = α)
5. Ci = −
1
2
, if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 < x1 ∩ (x1 = α ∪ x2 = α)
The accumulated counting number Ct0 ,t1 of the evolution-
ary trajectory during the time interval [t0, t1] is defined (
see Eq.2 in [19]) as
C ≡
∑
i
Ci. (2)
The accumulated counting number C quantifies the net
number of cycles around the reference point (α, β). As
mentioned [19], such a quantity can help us to detect de-
terministic behaviours in a stochastic process. C indicates
the existence of cycles when it does not equal 0. Addition-
ally, C > 0 (C < 0) indicates that the direction of the cy-
cles is counterclockwise (clockwise). We use the subscript
(t0, t1) to specify the observation in time interval [t0, t1],
like Ct0,t1 . Clearly, C is time odd (Ct0,t1 = - Ct1,t0). By
calculating C and investigating how it changes with time,
we can verify the existence, persistence and direction of
the cycles.
3.2 Measurement of the frequency of the cycles
In this article, the experimental periodic frequency (fexp)
is defined as the time averaged net cycles counted in an
experimental trajectory, which referring to [19], is
fexp =
∑
i Ci
t1 − t0
, (3)
where
∑
iCi is the accumulated counting number of cycles
in time interval [t0, t1] (the time unit in these 12 experi-
ments is discrete in the experimental round), and f¯exp is
the average fexp over 12 groups of each of games 1 to 6 or
6 groups of each of games 7 to 12.
3.3 Measurement of the radius of the cycles
Whenever a transit-i crosses the Poincare section, the Eu-
clidean distance (denoted as xi) between the crossing dot
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram for counting cycles [18,19]. Back-
ground lattice represents the 25 social states. Including 4 tran-
sits, the successive segments (1 → 2 . . . → 5) form a tra-
jectory of a social evolutionary transit path. The segment S
is the Poincare section (tripwire) from Pc := (α, β) (star) to
Pe := (α, 0) at the lower edge. In this paper, for each game,
we set (α, β) at its Nash equilibrium (xN , yN ). For example,
for Game-1, (α, β) = (0.91, 0.09). The direction of the cycle
surrounding the centre (α, β) is clockwise, as predicted by the
two models.
and the centre N can be measured. Furthermore, for a
given time interval [t0, t1], the average radius of the cy-
cles1 can be defined as
Rt0,t1 =
∑
i xiCi∑
i |Ci|
(4)
where i (=1, 2, 3, · · ·) denotes the i-th time that the tra-
jectory passes the Poincare section. The sum covers all
of the transits across the Poincare section. For example,
according to Eq. 4, the radius of the net cycles (R1,5) in
Fig. 2 is -0.115. We use this measurement to evaluate the
change in radius with time, which is necessary for cycle
testing [22,18].
4 Results
As mentioned above (see Fig. 2 and the related text), we
can illustrate the evolutionary trajectories of each group
in the 12 experiments with the experimental data (see
section 2.1). Accordingly, using the methods described in
section 3, we can measure the experimental observations
(accumulated number, frequency and radius of cycles) of
the 12 experiments. Then, the experimental observations
can be compared with the theoretical expectations (see
section A.4) of the two different models. Results of statis-
tical analysis are reported as follows.
1 This observable, as a vector, can be understood as the mo-
ment of force or torque in classical mechanics in physics.
4.1 Existence, persistence and direction of the cycles
Result 1: Cycles exist and persist, and the directions of
net cycles in the “stochastic” trajectories meet the predic-
tions of both evolutionary dynamics.
To test the existence of net cycles as in [19], we calcu-
late the average value C¯1,200 for the 12 games as well as
the standard error of the mean (s.e.m) over the groups.
The results are shown in Table 2. Using the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, we find that the C¯1,200 of all games are
significantly less than 0, indicating the existence of cycles
in all games except game 9,2 see Table 2. Using the 12
games as samples, we find that the existence of the net
cycles is significant (p=0.002, Wilcoxon signed-rank test
with C1,200 = 0).
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test verifies the persistence
of cycles by comparing C1,100 and C101,200 of the 12 games.
Results show that the null hypothesis: C1,100=C101,200
cannot be rejected (p=0.695, two-tailed, d.f.=11), which
indicates the persistence of cycles.
Since all C¯1,200 of the 12 games are negative (see Table
2), the empirical directions of the cycles are clockwise sta-
tistically, consistent with the directions predicted by both
of the two dynamics models as shown in Fig. 4.
4.2 Frequencies of the cycles
Result 2: The periodic frequency of the net cycles can be
tested in data.
Before calculating the frequencies of cycles as in [19],
the number of cycles in the trajectory is counted. Fig. 3
presents the average number of the net cycles (C1,t, see
Eq. 2 for its explanation) along time t (t is up to 200
rounds in experiments, t = 200) of each game. The 12
curves respectively represent the average cycles counted
for the 12 experiments. For example, the red curve (Game
6) ends at about -10 at t = 200. This indicates that in the
200-round game, about 10 cycles are counted on average
over the 12 groups; meanwhile, the negative value implies
the clockwise direction of the cycles.
The frequencies fexp of the 12 experiments are calcu-
lated according to Eq. 3. The results are shown in Table 2.
The observed periodic frequencies of the 12 games are sig-
nificantly different, which is consistent with the patterns
of Fig. 3. Specifically, Eq. 3 indicates that the frequencies
can be represented by the slopes of the C1,200 curves in
Fig. 3. Since the slopes are different for the 12 games, the
frequencies are different.
In Section 5, we will show that the empirical frequen-
cies of the cycles is an appropriate criterion for evaluating
the models quantitatively.
2 However, two points should be mentioned. First, each of
games 7 to 12 only has 6 groups while each of games 1 to 6 has
12 groups; second, theoretically, the frequencies of games 1, 7,
3 and 9 are small, indicating that the formation of each cycle
needs more time. So we use half of the observations of games
1 to 6, again, p-value> 5% in games 1, 2, 3 and 4. So we still
use this empirical number of cycles when comparing with the
theoretical value later.
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Table 2. Accumulated C, frequency and radius of the net cycles in the 12 experiments.
Game Obs.♭ C¯1,200 s.e.m
† p-value‡ f¯exp s.e.m
† R¯1,100 R¯101,200 D¯
§ p-value‡
1 12 -3.167 0.976 0.003 0.016 0.005 -0.035 -0.018 0.017 0.166
2 12 -4.000 1.142 0.013 0.020 0.006 -0.017 -0.026 -0.009 0.184
3 12 -2.750 0.789 0.006 0.014 0.004 -0.016 -0.010 0.006 0.386
4 12 -5.917 1.062 0.003 0.030 0.005 -0.017 -0.015 0.002 0.488
5 11 -8.167 1.160 0.002 0.041 0.006 -0.022 -0.024 -0.002 0.751
6 12 -10.083 1.311 0.002 0.051 0.007 -0.026 -0.020 0.006 0.204
7 6 -1.333 0.211 0.023 0.007 0.001 -0.014 0.000 0.014 0.423
8 6 -4.667 1.606 0.046 0.023 0.008 -0.017 -0.025 -0.008 0.423
9 6 -2.333 1.282 0.091 0.012 0.006 -0.010 -0.006 0.004 0.873
10 6 -6.333 1.745 0.027 0.032 0.009 -0.016 -0.016 0.000 0.522
11 6 -12.000 1.125 0.027 0.060 0.006 -0.024 -0.026 -0.001 0.749
12 6 -9.000 2.408 0.027 0.045 0.012 -0.021 -0.017 0.004 0.631
♭: Number of groups. †: Standard error of the mean. ‡: Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed. §: Average difference between
R¯1,100 and R¯101,200 over 12 (6) groups.
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Fig. 3. The dependence of the counted cycles on time. Each line is the average accumulated C for one game. Negative values
of the average accumulated C1,t indicate that the cycles are clockwise. Successive decline of the values indicates the persistence
of cycles along time. The red curve reports the results of Game-6, in which the accumulated C¯ is almost -10, indicating 10
clockwise cycles were obtained in 200 rounds and the frequency of cycles is about 0.05 (per round).
4.3 Change of the cycle radius over time
Result 3: The radius of the cycles does not change with
time in the experiments, which supports the predictions
of both of the two models.
For the 200-round experiments, our hypothesis is that
the radius of the first 100 rounds (R1,100) is equal to that
of the second 100 rounds (R101,200). The calculated re-
sults of R1,100 and R101,200 of the 12 games are shown in
Table 2. Using the groups in each game as samples, the
radius does not change in each of the 12 games (p-values
are exhibited in Table 2, last column), and therefore the
equal hypothesis cannot be significantly rejected. Using
the 12 games as samples, we find that the equal hypoth-
esis cannot be significantly rejected (p = 0.308, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test). Therefore, we can say that the state-
ment that the radius does not change with respect to time
is statistically supported.
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5 Frequency as a criterion for model testing
As mentioned above, as a novel index, empirical frequen-
cies of cycles could be employed to evaluate theoretical
models quantitatively. We regress theoretical frequency
(fs and fa in Table 1) on experimental frequencies (f¯exp in
Table 2) with the method of OLR and display the results
in Table 3 (Appendix B provides details). These statis-
tical results state that both of the models can interpret
the differences among the observed frequencies quite well
(t > 5 in Table 3), while the adjusted model (t-value 6.41)
performs slightly better.
In game theory, there exist tens of models known as
population dynamics models (e.g., [10,11,12,29,30]), fi-
nite population models (e.g., [31,21,7]) or learning models
(e.g., [32,33]). Comparisons between the models can be
important [18,19], however since the main purpose of this
paper is to report the definitive measurements in experi-
ments, we do not extend our theoretical analysis to such
comparisons. Nevertheless, the clear result (t > 5 in Ta-
ble 3) indicates that dynamic game models could be used
effectively in combination with laboratory game experi-
ments.
Table 3. OLR results of f¯exp vs. fs and fa for the two models.
f¯exp Coef. s.e.m t P > |t| [ 95% C.I. ]
fs 0.157 0.026 6.01 0.000 0.099 0.215
cons -0.018 0.008 -2.16 0.056 -0.036 0.001
fa 0.519 0.081 6.41 0.000 0.338 0.699
cons 0.001 0.005 0.25 0.805 −0.010 0.012
6 Discussion and summary
First, in the 12 experimental 2 × 2 games, we have con-
firmed the existence and persistence of the cycles, and
the frequencies of cycles have been tested quantitatively.
Furthermore, we have found that the observed periodic
frequencies of the cycles are different when the games dif-
fer. Moreover, the experimental frequencies are linearly,
positively and significantly related to the theoretical fre-
quencies.
Experimental confirmation of social behaviour cycles
is difficult [34]. Researchers continue to seek significant
cyclic patterns to support evolutionary dynamics [18,22,
25,19]. In some earlier works [35], angular momentum was
employed as an observable, but no periodic frequency was
reported. In Ref. [18], CRI was developed to index cycles,
but once again no information was provided about peri-
odic frequency [18]. In Ref. [19], frequency served as an
index for cycles, howeverthere is only one payoff matrix in
their experiments, so that a quantitative comparison with
theoretical frequencies is impossible. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to report that cycles’
frequencies depend on the payoff matrices of the corre-
sponding games.
We wish to emphasise our puzzles as follows. Even
though the theoretical frequencies (fs and fa) could meet
experimental frequencies (f¯exp) well by OLR (see Table 3),
we still hope to emphasise that such correspondence could
be a coincidence, for example because the differences in
the observed frequencies (f¯exp) could be interpreted by
other factors, e.g., the distance (Dc := [(xN − 0.5)
2 +
(yN − 0.5)
2]
1
2 ) from the centre of state space (0.5, 0.5) to
the Nash Equilibrium (xN , yN ) of a game. For these 12
games, by OLR, there is a significant dependence of f¯exp
on Dc (t > 5) too, see Table 4. We are unaware of the
reason for this significance. At the same time, we are un-
aware of why the coefficient in Table 3 differs significantly
from 1. Admittedly, the relationship between games’ pay-
off matrix and empirical frequency is unclear. We hope to
return to these issues in the future.
Table 4. OLR results of f¯exp and the distance between the
Nash Equilibrium and the centre of state space.
f¯exp Coef. s.e.m t P > |t| [ 95% C.I. ]
Dc -0.104 0.017 -6.01 0.000 -0.142 -0.065
cons 0.067 0.007 9.92 0.000 0.052 0.082
In summary, we report the existence of persistent cy-
cles, as well as their directions in 2 × 2 games. Further-
more, the numerical frequencies of cycles are measured
definitively and found to be significantly different across
the 12 games (see f¯exp in Table 2). We believe these empir-
ical frequencies of cycles can be interpreted more precisely.
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Appendix
A Theoretical predictions on cycles
Two versions of replicator dynamics, standard repli-
cator dynamics and adjusted replicator dynam-
ics, are used as references in the 12 experiments.
As mentioned in main text, these parameter-free
models are the most widely applied in both the
economics and physics literature [21,2,12,16,7,
36]. Using the standard methods (e.g. [10,6]), we
can replicate the theoretical results on cycles.
A.1 Social states
In the view of evolutionary game theory [12], at
each moment t, the consequence of social inter-
action can be described as a social state, which
is a vector with the densities of strategies in each
population as components. In the two-population
game here, the strategy set for each player in the
row population is (up, down) or (X1,X2) while
for each player in the column population is (left,
right) or (Y1,Y2). Let p (q) denote the density
of X1 (Y1) in the row (column) population, then
x:=(p, q) ∈ X represents a social state, herein X is
the social state space. Therefore, the state space
is always a unit square as shown in Fig. 2.
Because there are four subjects in each pop-
ulation in this game, the social state space is
X={0, 1
4
, 2
4
, 3
4
, 1}×{0, 1
4
, 2
4
, 3
4
, 1}. That means, the
actual full state space is a unit square of 5×5 lat-
tice points in which each social state can be rep-
resented by a lattice point, as shown in Fig. 2. For
example, the social state 3 denoted as xA=(
2
4
, 1
4
)
is a state where 2
4
of subjects in the first popu-
lation choose X1 and
1
4
of subjects in the second
population choose Y1. It is clear that, at a given
round (time) in an experiment, the social state
can be observed [22,37,25,18].
A.2 State-dependent payoff
There are a total of four possible strategies in the
two populations. Suppose x (y) is the proportion
of the row (column) population using strategy X1
(Y1). It is natural that the density of strategy X2
(Y2) is 1 − x (1 − y). According to the payoff
matrices of the games (see Table 1), the average
payoff for the four strategies can be expressed as
the following matrix:

UX1
UX2
UY1
UY2

 =


a11 y + a12 (1− y)
a21 y + a22 (1− y)
b11 x+ b21 (1− x)
b12 x+ b22 (1− x)

 (5)
where UXi (UYi), i = 1, 2 is the payoff for each
player in the row (column) population choosing
strategy Xi (Yi).
Further, the average payoff for each population
can be aggregated as:[
U¯X
U¯Y
]
=
[
xUX1 + (1− x) UX2
y UY1 + (1− y) UY2
]
. (6)
Therefore, if the social state at t is at (x, y), ac-
cording to the parameters of the payoff matrix of
a given game, the average payoff for each strategy
and the average payoff for each population can be
calculated [6,20].
A.3 Eigenvalues
To evaluate the cyclic social behaviours in the ex-
perimental games, we focus on the eigenvalues of
the ordinary differential equations (ODE) of evo-
lutionary dynamics. The systems are non-linear
first-order differential equations. Mathematically,
the eigenvalues, which are calculable, determine
the dynamic properties of a system. To compare
the experimental results with some earlier works [6,
38,2,9], we calculate the eigenvalues of the 12
games for the two dynamics.
A.3.1 Standard replicator dynamics
The ODE of the standard replicator dynamics
is [9,6]
{
x˙ = x(UX1 − U¯X)
y˙ = y(UY1 − U¯Y )
(7)
where (x, y) indicates a social state, U and U¯
have the same implications as in Eq. 5 and Eq. 6,
respectively. The ODE describes how the social
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state changes according to the payoff of the strate-
gies. For the 2 × 2 games whose payoff matrices
are shown as Fig. 1, according to Eq. 5 and Eq. 6,
the ODE above can be presented as

x˙ = −x (x− 1) ·
(a12 − a22 + a11 y − a12 y − a21 y + a22 y)
y˙ = −y (y − 1) ·
(b21 − b22 + b11 x− b12 x− b21 x+ b22 x)
(8)
If we let x˙ = 0 and y˙ = 0, then there ex-
ists a unique inner Nash equilibrium of standard
replicator dynamics (Ns) in the rectangular coor-
dinate system constructed by x and y (0 < x, y <
1), which is
Ns =
(
b22 − b21
b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
,
a22 − a12
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
)
(9)
We calculate the Nash equilibrium for the 12 games,
denoted by (xN , yN), as Table 1 shows. Then sur-
rounding the Ns, the Jacobian is
Js =
[
0 Js
12
Js
21
0
]
(10)
in which:
Js
12
= −
(b11 − b12) (b21 − b22) (a11 − a12 − a21 + a22)
(b11 − b12 − b21 + b22)
2
(11)
and
Js
21
= −
(a11 − a21) (a12 − a22) (b11 − b12 − b21 + b22)
(a11 − a12 − a21 + a22)
2
(12)
Then, the square of the eigenvalues of the Jaco-
bian of the standard replicator dynamics, denoted
as λ2s, is
λ2s =
(a11 − a21) (a12 − a22) (b11 − b12) (b21 − b22)
(a11 − a12 − a21 + a22) (b11 − b12 − b21 + b22)
(13)
Plugging the payoff matrixes of the 12 games into
Eq.13, we find that the squares of the eigenvalues
are all negative, as shown in the λ2s column in
Table 1.
A.3.2 Adjusted replicator dynamics
The alternative version is called adjusted repli-
cator dynamics (also called as payoff-normalised
replicator dynamics in the economics literature) [21,
10,39,40,41]. Its ODE can be expressed as
{
x˙ = x(UX1 − U¯X)U¯
−1
X
y˙ = y(UY1 − U¯Y )U¯
−1
Y
(14)
Obviously, different to the replicator dynamics
shown in Eq. 7, the item U¯−1X and U¯
−1
Y in Eq. 14
make the payoffs normalised. Specified for 2 × 2
games whose payoff matrices are shown in Fig. 1,
according to Eq. 5 and Eq. 6, the ODE of the
adjusted replicator dynamics can be presented as


x˙ = x (1− x) [(a12 − a22) + Ay] ·
[Axy + (a12 − a22)x+ (a21 − a22)y + a22]
−1
y˙ = y (1− y) [(b21 − b22) +Bx] ·
[Bxy + (b21 − b22)y + (b12 − b22)x+ b22]
−1
(15)
where we have introduced the short hand A =
a11− a21+ a22− a12 and B = b11− b12 + b22− b21.
For adjusted replicator dynamics, there also
exists a unique inner Nash equilibrium Na in the
rectangular coordinate system constructed by x
and y (0 < x, y < 1), which is
Na =
(
b21 − b22
b21 − b22 + b12 − b11
,
a12 − a22
a12 − a22 + a21 − a11
)
.
(16)
As Na in Eq. 16 is equal to Ns in Eq. 9, we
have the result that the Nash equilibria of the
two models are identical.
Again, surrounding the equilibrium point Na,
the Jacobian of Eq. 15 is
Ja =
[
0 Ja
12
Ja
21
0
]
. (17)
in which:
Ja
12
=
(b11 − b12)(b21 − b22)(a12 − a22 + a21 − a11)
2
(a12a21 − a11a22)(b21 − b22 + b12 − b11)2
(18)
and
Ja
21
=
(a11 − a21)(a12 − a22)(b21 − b22 + b12 − b11)
2
(b21b12 − b11b22)(a12 − a22 + a21 − a11)2
.
(19)
Then, the square of the eigenvalues of the Jaco-
bian of the adjusted replicator dynamics, denoted
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Fig. 4. The expected velocity field of the adjusted replicator dynamics. The arrow of the vector at each site represents the
direction of the transit. The magnitude of the vector at each site represents the strength of the transit. At the 25 observable
states, a two dimensional vector can be plotted with Eq. 15 and the payoff matrix elements in Table 1. Surrounding the Nash
equilibrium point (red cross), all of the global patterns of the 12 games are of clockwise.
as λ2a, is
λ2a =
(a11 − a21) (a12 − a22) (b11 − b12) (b21 − b22)
(a12 a21 − a11 a22) (b21 b12 − b11 b22)
(20)
For the 12 games, the results of λ2a are shown in
Table 1.
One point worth emphasising is that since all
the λ2 are negative, the eigenvalues should be
purely imaginary. So, the solution of the dynam-
ics (Eq. 8 and Eq. 15 near Nash equilibrium) is
cyclic and equivalent to simple harmonic motion
(SHM). The following part explains this point in
more detail.
We use (△x,△y) to present the deviation from
the Nash Equilibrium of (x, y). Referring to the
Jacobian (Eq. 17 for adjusted replicator dynam-
ics), we have[
△˙x
△˙y
]
=
[
0 Ja
12
Ja
21
0
] [
△x
△y
]
. (21)
From time derivation of this equation, we have[
△¨x
△¨y
]
=
[
Ja
12
Ja
21
0
0 Ja
12
Ja
21
] [
△x
△y
]
. (22)
Mathematically, this dynamics is equivalent to
asymmetric games with cyclic dynamics (see Eq. J. 3
in Appendixes J in textbook [2]) and the solutions
of this dynamics are closed cyclical orbits.
A.4 Theoretical expectations
The theoretical expectations of directions, frequen-
cies and changes in radius of the cycles can be ob-
tained from the eigenvalues (in Eq. 13 and Eq. 20)
as well as the Jacobian (in Eq. 10 and Eq. 17).
A.4.1 Directions of cycles
In state space, the direction of cycles could be
clockwise or counter-clockwise. We use two meth-
ods to evaluate it.
One way is to plot the velocity field on the ba-
sis of Eq. 8 and Eq. 15. As shown in Fig. 4, all
directions of the velocity fields are clockwise. An-
other way is using the Jacobian described [6] be-
fore. Calculating the Jacobian (Eq. 10 or Eq. 17)
explicitly, we can get the changing direction at
each given state around Ns (or Na). For the two
dynamics, as J12 > 0 and J21 < 0 hold for all the
12 games, we have all the directions in a clockwise
manner.
At the same time, it also explains the existence
and persistence of the cycles in the same ways.
A.4.2 Frequencies of cycles
As mentioned above, the eigenvalue λ (denoted
as λ = α ± iβ) of the 12 games is purely imagi-
nary, i.e. the real part (α) is zero for all λ. Math-
ematically, the motion is equivalent to SHM, in
which the value of β refers to the angular fre-
quency (also called angular speed, see page 199
in [42]). Since there are 2pi radians in one cycle,
in order to complete the cycle 2pi/β units of time
are needed. So the theoretical periodic frequency
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(ftheo) is explicitly given as:
ftheo =
β
2pi
(23)
For the 12 games, the values of ftheo for standard
and adjusted replicator dynamics (denoted as fs
and fa, respectively) are different (shown in Ta-
ble 1). They will serve as the theoretical expecta-
tions (in Table 3 and Fig. 5) to be compared with
observed frequencies.
A.4.3 Radius of cycles
As noted, for all of the 12 games and both of the
models, the real parts of the eigenvalues (α) are
equal to 0. As mentioned above, motions of these
game systems are mathematically equivalent to
simple harmonic motion. Since α = 0, the radius
of cycles does not change with time.
In the 200-round experiments, the testable hy-
pothesis is: the cycle radius of the first 100 rounds
equals that of the second 100 rounds.
B Evaluation of the two replicator dynamics
This part is the supporting material for Table 3.
The statistic method and the comparison results
are explained as follows.
B.1 Statistic method
Referring to the theoretical frequency (fs and fa
in Table 1) and the experimental frequencies (f¯exp
in Table 2), the OLR results are shown in Ta-
ble 3. The relationship between the theoretical
frequencies (ftheo) and experimental frequencies
(f¯exp) of the 12 games can also be demonstrated
as in Fig. 5. The statistical testing and analysis
are explained as follows.
(1) For the comparison with fs from the stan-
dard replicate dynamics, statistical results show
that the coefficient of the linear regression over
the 12 paired samples is 0.157 ± 0.026. It indi-
cates that the positive correlation between the-
oretical frequencies and experimental frequencies
is strongly significant (at t > 5 level). In addi-
tion, the constant of the regression is −0.018 ±
0.008 (p = 0.056 > 0.05) and its 95% C.I. [-0.036
0.shi001] includes zero. This implies that there is
no systematic deviation.
(2) Comparing with fa from the adjusted repli-
cate dynamics, statistical results show that the
coefficient of the linear regression over the 12 paired
samples is 0.519 ± 0.081. This indicates that the
positive correlation between theoretical frequen-
cies and experimental frequencies is strongly sig-
nificant (at t = 6.41 > 5 level). In addition,
the constant of the regression is 0.001 ± 0.005
(p = 0.805, two-tailed) and its 95% C.I. [-0.010
0.012] includes 0.000. This implies that there is
no systematic deviation here either.
B.2 Comparison results
The comparison results are as follows.
(1) According to the p-value of the coefficient
of the linear regression, both of the models’ ex-
pectations are positively related to experimental
observations, and can infer the difference of the
observed frequencies well. Since the constant is
closer to 0 and the t-value (see Table 3) is larger,
the adjusted replicator dynamics therefore per-
forms better.
(2) However, neither of the two models can
capture the observed frequencies quantitatively
and exactly, because the values of the coefficients
of the linear regression for both the standard repli-
cator dynamics (0.157± 0.026) and the adjusted
replicator dynamics (0.519 ± 0.081) are signifi-
cantly different from 1.
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